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1. Introduction
Agricultural trade liber-
alization between the EU
and the Southern and East-
ern Mediterranean coun-
tries (SEMCs) is a contro-
versial issue in the politi-
cal arena. On the European
side, the coincidence in the
seasonal productive pat-
terns between SEMCs and
EU-Mediterranean regions
provokes a fierce market
competition, especially in
fruits and vegetables
(F&V). Indeed, stakehold-
ers in Mediterranean EU
regions affirm that every
revision of the Euro-Me -
diterranean agreements is
an undermining of the
Community preference (see
discussion in the last sec-
tions of Garcia-Alvarez-
Coque et al., 2012). On the
other side of the Mediter-
ranean Sea, some argue
that the Association Agree-
ments do not contribute to
mitigating food dependency in SEMCs, and contribute to
dismantling the protection to key agricultural sectors
(Akesbi, 2011). 
In the trade literature, the examples considering agro-
food trade between these two areas are less frequent than
trade in other sectors. Bensassi et al. (2012) state that part
of this relative scarcity stems from the initial exclusion of
agricultural products from
the tariff liberalization a-
greed in the Barcelona
process. In addition, the
analysis of agro-food tra -
de liberalization in F&V
between the EU and
SEMCs is a challenging
task. One challenge stems
from the commercial poli-
cies with which the EU
protects its domestic pro-
duction for a set of F&V
of main interest to the
SEMCs. It applies the En-
try Price (EP) system, to-
gether with tariff-rate and
EP quotas, all of them
with seasonal variations.
Besides, a second chal-
lenge emerges from the
trade preferences mutual-
ly granted among the EU
and each SEMC in the
framework of Euro-Med
Agreements. These pref-
erences and the variety of
trade instruments provoke
the existence of a wide ar-
ray of different situations
regarding the tariffs and other barriers to trade levied. Fi-
nally, a third challenge is the importance of the heterogene-
ity among importer countries if trade is considered between
SEMCs and several EU countries, rather than the EU as a
whole. 
Nonetheless, several papers deal with the agro-food trade
liberalization between the EU and the SEMCs. For in-
stance, when performing simulations to quantify the impact
of the potential inclusion of agricultural goods in the 1996
Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, Nowak‐
Lehmann et al. (2007) find that Turkish vegetable exports
would increase by 21%, while Turkish fruit exports would
increase by 18.7%.
Garcia-Alvarez-Coque et al. (2009) simulate multilateral
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trade liberalization processes in the EU fresh tomato mar-
ket, considering different options ranging from a tariff re-
duction to the elimination of the EP system. Their results
have implications on the two shores of the Mediterranean
Sea: as for the EU producers, they would suffer a certain -
although not dramatic- impact in terms of reduced prices
and intra-EU sales. Conversely, most of the gains stemming
from the liberalization are accrued by Moroccan exporters,
as volumes exported and export prices would rise substan-
tially. 
Garcia-Alvarez-Coque et al. (2010) simulate the phasing
out of the EP system for several F&V, considering all the
particular trade policies applied. For the different products
considered, the phasing out of the EP would affect mainly
the vegetables considered rather than the fruits, showing re-
sults for tomatoes that are in line with those indicated in the
previous paper. Besides, these authors particularly highlight
that eliminating the EP system would affect markets differ-
ently according to the season considered. 
With this background, this paper aims to shed light on the
effects on Moroccan exports of the trade preferences grant-
ed by the EU in F&V, considered both jointly and separate-
ly. In particular, we consider the different border treatments
including the trade preferences, the EP system, seasonality
and quotas, and taking into account the importance of het-
erogeneity between importing countries. 
Methodologically speaking, we use a gravity model of
trade that considers both sectoral and monthly variability of
trade preferences: the reduced EP and the preferential tar-
iffs, as well as quantitative limits for these preferences. We
contribute to the existing literature in that we construct new
indicators for trade preferences in F&V and we introduce
them into gravity models. Furthermore, they are estimated
by following the most recent economic literature that deals
with the problem of endogeneity (Baier and Bergstrand,
2007; Baier et al., 2014)1.
The rest of this article is divided into six sections: after
this introduction, section 2 describes the trade policy and
preferences applied to F&V by the EU. Section 3 critically
discusses the contrasting results of the gravity literature on
trade policy and preferences analysis in F&V. Section 4 de-
scribes the data used in the empirical analysis. The empiri-
cal analysis is presented in section 5, which includes
methodological choices, main results and a sensitivity
analysis distinguishing the effect of trade preferences on
fruits vs. vegetables, and for specific EU importers. Finally,
the last section concludes with a discussion of policy im-
plications.
2. F&V trade policy in the EU
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EU pro-
tects some of its F&V through the EP system, which con-
sists of a two-tiered tariff2. When the border price of ex-
ports to the EU is above the EP level – also called trigger
EP, which is set in EU regulations – the consignment is
levied by an ad valorem tariff; exports priced below the
trigger EP are levied with a supplementary specific tariff af-
ter being levied with the ad valorem tariff. The amount of
the specific tariff depends on the relationship between the
trigger EP and the border price for the shipment: the cheap-
er is the product, the higher is the specific tariff applied, the
aim being to prevent the entry of cheap products that may
undermine market competitiveness of EU production.
Thus, when the rate [border price to trigger EP] ranges be-
tween 92% and 100%, the specific tariff equals the differ-
ence between them (rounded in 2% steps). If the rate is less-
er than 92%, the tariff is the maximum tariff equivalent
(MTE) for the product according to WTO commitments. Fi-
nally, it must be taken under consideration that the trigger
EP varies seasonally for every product, as the preferences
linked to it do.
The EP system may be understood as a de facto minimum
import price which reduces market instability. Empirical
analyses of the trade flows for products affected by the sys-
tem appear in several papers (see some recent discussions
in Agrosynergie, 2008; Goetz and Grethe, 2009, 2010;
Cioffi et al., 2011; Santeramo and Cioffi, 2012; Santeramo
et al., 2014), which generally coincide in that the system is
more relevant for vegetables than for fruits. Besides, it also
affects differently the EU trade partners, with their limita-
tive effects falling mostly on SEMCs’ exports. A review of
the implementation of the system has been approved in
May 2014, aiming at better accounting for qualitative dif-
ferences across goods, and also aiming at preventing op-
portunistic behavior of some operators to circumvent the
payment of the specific tariff. 
Regarding trade preferences granted by the EU to the
SEMCs, they are negotiated under a bilateral basis and thus
are not identical across SEMCs. As Emlinger et al. (2010,
p. 600) point out: “Although the process is known as the
Euro-Mediterranean process, the tariff preferences are ne-
gotiated bilaterally between the EU and each of its Mediter-
ranean partners on a product-by-product basis”. These same
authors find that SEMCs have significant preferences com-
pared to other countries exporting to the EU, the magnitude
of the preferences differs among countries; Morocco being
the country with the highest preferences3. In any event,
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1 A standard problem in empirical work is the potential endogene-
ity of right-hand side (RHS) variables. If any of the RHS variables
in a regression is correlated with the error term, that variable is
considered econometrically endogenous and ordinary least squares
(OLS) may yield biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates.
2 The fresh F&V for which the EP applies are tomatoes, cucumbers,
globe artichokes, courgettes, oranges, clementines, lemons, table
grapes, apples, pears, apricots, cherries, peaches and plums. Be-
sides, wine and fruit juices also are protected with this system. To
implement the system, the border price of imports can be proxied
by the Standard Import Value (SIV).
3 At the end of 2009, the EU and Morocco concluded a revision of
the agricultural protocol, which supposed a further liberalization of
trade in agricultural products. As explained in the main text, such
revision entered into force in 2012. 
preferential concessions to SEMCs follow a similar pattern.
For a set of goods, free access is granted without quantita-
tive restraints. For other goods, the free access is limited to
a specified quantity, over which a tariff reduction usually ap-
plies. For some other products, when the EP is of application,
the EU has agreed a reduced EP, commonly together with a
quantitative limit also known as the EP quota. 
As a graphical instance of the effect of trade preferences on
prices of imported goods, Figure 1 plots the effect of the trade
preferences for tomatoes originated in Morocco compared to
the MFN conditions and to the no duty (free trade) conditions,
corresponding to March4. The effect of preferences can be ob-
served comparing the differences in internalized prices for
goods from different origins with the same border price, i.e.
the vertical gap at the same abscissa. As shown in Figure 1,
Morocco enjoys substantial price advantage compared to
MFN countries in all the border price ranges. On the left side
of the diagram, relatively cheap imports are not constrained
by the MFN trigger EP, as long as they fall between the pref-
erential trigger EP and the MFN trigger EP. Below the prefer-
ential trigger EP, Moroccan exports still face a lower ad val-
orem tariff. On the right side of the diagram, the preference
consisting on the elimination of the ad valorem tariff allows
keeping a certain advantage to Morocco, since they enter un-
der duty free conditions5. In other words, two products with
the same border price may have a substantial difference in
terms of after-duties price depending on their origin. 
Emlinger et al. (2010) simulate and discuss the impact of
a multilateral agreement on the preferential margins of the
SEMCs, finding that multilateral liberalization would lead
to a reduction in the heterogeneity of access to the EU mar-
ket among SEMCs. Otherwise, we focus in other major
concern for SEMCs: regional trade liberalization. Multilat-
eral versus regional trade liberalization differ in that re-
gional trade liberalization grants specific preferences to re-
gional trading partners6, and then, in our specific case,
SEMCs have an advantage in comparison to extra-EU com-
petitors not involved, or that do not include agricultural
preferences in trade agreements with the EU.
3. Gravity analysis of F&V trade flows in
the Euro-Mediterranean Area
The analysis of the trade flows in the context of specific
trade policies for F&V, preferences and seasonality can be
made following different lines of research. One approach is
using the gravity model, which, in its basic form, assumes
that trade between countries can be compared to the gravi-
tational force between two objects: it is directly related to
countries’ size and inversely related to the distance between
them. Exports from country i to country j are explained by
their economic sizes, their populations, geographical dis-
tances and a set of dummies incorporating some character-
istics common to specific flows.
Theoretical support for the research in this field was origi-
nally very poor but since the second half
of the 1970s several theoretical develop-
ments have appeared in support of the
gravity model (Anderson, 1979). Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003) support the
idea that the key aspect of the gravity
model is the dependence of trade on a
bilateral and multilateral resistance fac-
tor. These authors refer to price indices
as “multilateral resistance” (MR)7 vari-
ables, since they depend on all bilateral
resistances, including those not directly
involving the exporting country.
The gravity equation has a very high
empirical explanatory power. For this
reason, it has been established as a basic
tool in the analysis of international trade.
Within the gravity framework, we can
analyze the effect of, for example, the
ex-ante and ex-post effect of a free trade
4
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Source: authors’ calculations based on EU regulation on entry prices and EU-Morocco Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement.
Figure 1 - Effect on imports’ prices of the different border treatment. Morocco vs. NMF co-
untries vs. free trade (Fresh tomatoes, March conditions).
4 The preferential EP and tariff reduction agreed for March has re-
mained unchanged since the first Euro-Mediterranean Agreement.
Only the EP quota has been altered after the revisions carried out.
5 Only for the volumes below the EP quota.
6 Recall the static effects of the formation of a bilateral trade agree-
ment: trade creation and trade diversion. Note that Emlinger et al.
(2010) assume that the structure of Mediterranean exports will re-
main constant under multilateral liberalization. For example, these
authors find that Algeria and Tunisia would lose more than they
would gain from multilateral liberalization due to increasing extra-
EU competition.
7 The type of remoteness variable included in traditional gravity e-
quations to proxy average trade barriers relies solely on distance
and does not capture other factors impeding bilateral trade flows.
To overcome this problem, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) pro-
posed to include MR, defined as country specific price indices as-
sociated to trade among countries having in common a geograph-
ical remoteness with respect to the rest of the world.
agreement, the use of a common currency, etc. In this paper,
we focus on the ex-post analysis of trade preferences grant-
ed to Morocco, and then this effect is reflected in the mar-
ginal effect, i.e. the marginal effect of X on Y is the change
in Y when X changes by one unit, which can be estimated
with econometric techniques.
In this aspect, by using a gravity framework, several pa-
pers have dealt with the specificities of Euro-Med F&V
trade. They are Cardamone (2011), Emlinger et al. (2008),
and Martí-Selva and Garcia-Alvarez-Coque (2007). There
are a number of differences between them.
Martí-Selva and Garcia-Alvarez-Coque (2007) analyze
F&V import flows to the EU-15 from eight SEMCs over
the period 1995-2004. In their paper, the coefficient of the
dummy variable for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is found
to be negative and significant, thus these countries tend to
export less F&V than other countries in their sample. Ac-
cording to their results, although the Euro-Med Agreements
are important to boost F&V exports (the estimated coeffi-
cient for the dummy variable that equals 1 if the exporting
country has an agreement in force is positive and significant
from 2000), they fail to compensate for the disadvantage of
belonging to this region. Nonetheless, it is important to note
that these authors neither control for MR nor use panel
techniques to deal with the endogeneity of the trade policy
variable and hence, obtained coefficients might be biased.
Emlinger et al. (2008) evaluate the role of tariffs faced by
Mediterranean countries that export F&V to the EU, taking
into account tariff seasonality. To do so, tariff protection
measures are taken into account in their model through ad
valorem equivalents calculated at the product level. These au-
thors include country- and product-fixed effects to proxy for
the ‘remaining trade resistance’. Their results show that the
impact of tariffs varies by country, and they state that this re-
sult can be explained by country’s product specialization.
Specifically, the obtained Morocco’s tariff elasticity suggests
that tariffs remain an important barrier for its exports. How-
ever, another result is that tariff barriers are not the only ob-
stacles to trade and, as the impact of tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers on trade varies considerably from one exporting country
to another and then, the impact of EU-SEMCs liberalization
must be discussed country by country and on a product-by-
product basis. This conclusion is more recently confirmed by
Márquez-Ramos et al. (2012), who run regressions for differ-
ent exporters and different sectors, including tariffs and non-
tariff barriers. In fact, Márquez-Ramos et al. (2012) find that
trade facilitation variables are more important than tariffs and,
more specifically, their results show that tariff barriers are
non-significant for food products in a sample of 13 exporting
countries, while trade facilitation procedures are highly sig-
nificant. Therefore, additional trade liberalization measures,
aside of tariffs, should be considered in a gravity specification
that aims to analyze the effect of trade preferences granted to
a particular country in a number of agro-food products. 
Cardamone (2011) uses monthly data disaggregated at
product level, as we do in the present research, to assess the
effect of preferential trade agreements on monthly exports
of a number of F&V (fresh grapes, pears, apples, oranges
and mandarins) to the EU during 2001-2004. This author
analyses the effect of all EU preferential schemes operating
during this time period and takes not only tariffs into ac-
count but also the EU entry price system and quotas. Ac-
cording to her results, regional trade agreements appear ef-
fective in expanding EU-bound exports from developing
countries for all fruits except oranges. Nonetheless, Carda-
mone (2011) does not isolate the effect of trade preferences
granted to SEMCs on exports addressed to the EU, as she
uses 191 exporters for which trade statistics were available.
Regarding the seasonality, to our knowledge Cardamone
(2011) is the first study to assess the effect of preferential
trade agreements on monthly exports of F&V to the EU by
using a gravity model. Interestingly, this author considers
whether the quotas are exceeded. Emlinger et al. (2008)
used three four-month periods within the year, and Martí-
Selva and Garcia-Alvarez-Coque (2007) considered annual
data. As trade and preferential policies vary throughout the
year, decomposing in shorter periods allows for better cap-
turing the differential effects arisen.
4. Data and descriptive analysis
In this research, Morocco has been chosen as it is an in-
teresting case of study. First, among SEMCs it has been
granted by the EU the highest number of products with
preferential EP; second, quantitative restraints limit such
concession and, over those levels, additional tariff reduc-
tions apply as well. Third, those restraints are binding in
some goods. In addition, the EU is the main destination
market for Moroccan F&V. Finally, Morocco was among
the most affected countries by the EP system (Goetz and
Grethe, 2009; Cioffi et al., 2011).
As for the products considered, two fruits were selected
(CN 080510 sweet oranges, fresh, and CN 080520 clemen-
tines, fresh) as were two vegetables (CN 070200 tomatoes,
fresh or chilled, and CN 070700 cucumbers, fresh or chilled).
All of them are relevant products in the agro-food exports
from Morocco to the EU, and also considering Moroccan
market share in extra-EU imports. Some aggregate data on
trade figures for the period are shown in Table 1 below. Be-
sides, for the four products Morocco benefits from a prefer-
ential EP and, in almost all the period considered, that con-
cession is limited to certain quotas. Only in the case of or-
anges, the last revision of the agreement eliminated the EP
quota. In the period considered, the quotas were filled only in
the case of tomatoes. In the periods when the EP is not into
force or no preferential EP is granted, Morocco benefits from
an ad valorem tariff reduction for the four products.
As destinations within the EU, we have selected nine
5
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8 Belgium and Luxemburg are reported together in Comext statis-
tics and hence treated here as a single destination market. The oth-
er countries selected are Germany, Spain, France, the United King-
dom, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Slovakia.
countries8, rather than the EU itself. We proceed this way
for theoretical reasons and because of adequate monthly da-
ta availability. Among the countries selected we aimed to
include different instances regarding their own features and
relations with Morocco. France has traditional political, so-
cial and commercial links with Morocco, illustrated by the
relevance of their bilateral trade flows. Other countries such
as Germany and the United Kingdom are large net im-
porters of F&V; Italy and Spain are also big importers and
show a noticeable domestic F&V production as may be the
case as well of Belgium and the Netherlands, which have a
smaller domestic market. In the other two cases, both Hun-
gary and Slovakia belong to the Eastern EU members,
whose accession took place in 2004. In three of the four
products, the aggregated market share of the countries se-
lected is close to or greater than 80 per cent of total extra-
EU imports (see Table 1).
Our analysis extends from 2005 to 2012, so that all the
countries considered were EU members at that time. The
preferential agreement with Morocco was modified to en-
large the quotas because of the EU enlargement in May
2004. Its subsequent revision entered into force in October
2012, hence affecting the end of the period covered in the
analysis9. Table 1 summarizes some trade data for the prod-
uct and periods considered, in value terms. 
Exports from Morocco to the EU (i.e. imports originated in
Morocco) are considered on a monthly basis, due to the dif-
ferent seasonal border treatment applied to them –in some
cases, the EP level varies even within a month, and also due
to the marked seasonality of trade flows for the goods consid-
ered. The monthly trade flows have been collected from Eu-
rostat-Comext Database. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the
trade value for the imports originated in Morocco of the two
citrus fruits that we consider (clementines and oranges) along
January 2005-December 2012. It is noticeable that the im-
ports take place almost only from October to May in clemen-
tines and November to June in oranges10.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1. Methodological issues
The present article is based on the model specification
provided in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier et al.
(2014) for total bilateral exports, which we adapt to meas-
ure the effects of sectoral trade preferences on monthly ex-
ports. They begin with the following gravity model:
Where ln denotes natural logarithms; Xijt is the value of the
aggregate export flow from country i to country j in year t;
Yit (Yit ) is GDP in country i (j) in year t; DISTij is the bilater-
al distance between the economic centres of i and j; CON-
TINGij is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the two
countries share a common land border
(and 0 otherwise); COMLANGij is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
the two countries share a common lan-
guage; EIAijt is a variable indicating the
level of integration between the two
countries in year t, and lnΠ1–δjt (lnP1–δjt ) is
exporter i´s (importer j´s) non-linear and
unobservable MR price term.
When estimating the effects of the e-
conomic integration agreements, or
EIA (β4), if this variable is correlated
with the error term, it is econometrical-
ly endogenous and OLS can lead to bi-
ased and inconsistent coefficient estimates for  β4. In order
to eliminate endogeneity bias from the variable EIA, Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) propose using panel techniques and
estimation by FE of the following equation:
6
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Table 1 - Trade data for the selected Moroccan F&V at EU markets
(in value). 2005/2012.
Source: authors’ calculations from Comtrade and Comext databases.
9 Regarding the goods considered in this paper, the last revision e-
liminated the quota for oranges (CN 080510), and enlarged the
quotas for tomatoes (CN 070200), cucumbers (CN 070700) and
mandarins (CN 080520). Otherwise, the value and periods of the
preferential EP were not changed.
10 A similar seasonal pattern is observed for the two vegetables. It
is not depicted for space reasons.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Comext database.
Figure 2 - Value of the imports originated in Morocco to the selected EU countries, 2005-
2012. Oranges and clementines.
(1)
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Where ηij is a country-pair fixed effect to capture all time-
invariant bilateral factors influencing nominal trade flows11;
δit and ψit are exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects,
respectively, to capture time-varying exporter and importer
GDP, as well as all other time-varying country-specific ef-
fects that are unobservable in i and j and influence trade, in-
cluding the exporter´s and importer´s MR terms.
Furthermore, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Baier et al.
(2014) proposed using first differences (FD) techniques to
avoid the problems stemming from potential serially corre-
lated errors and unit-root processes for RHS variables in e-
quation (2). Although the FD transformation eliminates the
unobservable pair-specific changes over time (ηij), the un-
observable ij might be still playing a role. Therefore, Baier
et al. (2014) suggest introducing pair-specific fixed effects
after FD transformation of equation (2):
In the empirical analysis, we deal with the abovemen-
tioned problem of endogeneity by using panel techniques.
We estimate two different specifications. First, equation (4)
(by FE) and, second, equation (5) (by FD):
Where j is the importing EU country; k is the traded sec-
tor; s refers to each month Jan-Dec during the period 2005-
2012; m refers to monthly (Jan-Dec) variability and t to
yearly (2005-2012) variability; Δ12 is twelve-month (annu-
al) FD; varks are var1, var2, and var3; ψit, πkt and  m denote
importer-year, sector-year and monthly fixed effects, re-
spectively. By including dummies with importer-year ( ψit)
and product-year (πkt) variability, we are controlling for fac-
tors not included in the regression but that may have affect-
ed exports of Morocco. As an example, we might cite the
problem of E.coli that occurred in the cucumber campaign
in May 201112. Finally, μjk is the unobservable heterogene-
ity that does not vary over time but might vary depending
on importers and products. This term is dropped from the e-
quation in FD, εjks while  is the error term.
With regard to the analysis of trade preferences in the re-
lated gravity literature, Martí-Selva and Garcia-Alvarez-
Coque (2007) add a dummy variable to capture the effect of
the Euro-Med agreements, as is typical in the analysis of
trade integration (Bensassi et al., 2012; Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007). This type of variables has been recently
questioned, as it might be argued that the reality of a trade
integration agreement is poorly represented (Florensa et al.,
2015). This is specially the case for F&V, due to the com-
plexities in the trade policies that have been discussed
above. Hence, Emlinger et al. (2008) introduced in the
gravity equation the applied tariff and Cardamone (2011)
captured preferences in the EP as a dummy variable, and
the preferences in tariffs applied were measured as the dif-
ference between most favored nation (MFN) and preferen-
tial tariffs.
In addition to considering more accurate variables than
previous research to capture the sectoral and monthly vari-
ability of trade preferences, and in line with the most recent
gravity literature (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Baier et al.,
2014; Florensa et al., 2015), we suggest an approach that
implies a more precise estimation procedure in the case of
F&V, taking into account the methodological developments
to consider the econometric problem of endogeneity of
trade liberalization measures. In fact, there are at least two
reasons to believe that trade preferences are endogenous in
econometric terms, and that this endogeneity should be cor-
rected in order to obtain unbiased coefficients. One of them
is the non-linear and unobservable multilateral price/resi -
stance term (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). A second
reason is that trade preferences reflect specific interests and
historical trade relationships. In this vein, results obtained
in Emlinger et al. (2010) illustrated the heterogeneity of the
current preferences of each Mediterranean country. They s-
tate that the factors behind this heterogeneity are the vul-
nerability of European producers, the reciprocity in the
preferences, and the anteriority in the trade position of
some traditional F&V exporters to the EU, as is the case of
Morocco. As these factors might significantly impact F&V
exports from SEMCs to the EU and they are correlated with
trade preferences, a gravity equation estimated for F&V
sectors should control for endogeneity bias. To do so, we
estimate two different specifications, firstly, by using fixed
effects (FE) and, secondly, by using first-differences (FD).
Additionally, in our sample, the frequency of not availa-
ble values that might be (or might be not) representing ex-
ports equal to zero is 1,998 observations, i.e. 57.8% of a to-
tal of 3,456 observations (4 sectors*8 years*12 months* 9
destinations). Previous literature has used Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) to deal with heteroskedasti-
city and to take into account those observations of the de-
pendent variable that are equal to zero (Santos-Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006, Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos,
2008; Burguer et al., 2009; Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013). Mar-
tínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2008) used a sample of
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            (3)
11 Note that the fixed effect terms absorb all effects that are coun-
try-pair specific, namely distance, common border and language.
Thus, these country-pair-specific variables do not appear in equa-
tion (2).
12 According to the data available, Germany imported Moroccan
cucumbers per value of 15,685 euros in May 2011, while it did not
import cucumbers from Morocco in the rest of months along the pe-
riod considered. Recall that the E. coli outbreak began on 2 May 2011
and initially Spanish vegetables were identified as the source of con-
tamination. As a first panic response, a substitution for vegetables
from other origins, including Morocco, took place. A detailed de-
scription of the events can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wi
ki/2011_Germany_E._coli_O104:H4_outbreak. At http://www.efsa.
europa.eu/en/press/news/120711.htm a press release summarizing
the EU sanitary response can be found.
                
            
(4)
(5)
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data with sectoral variation, as we do in the present re-
search. Nonetheless, there is a lack of studies on the related
literature that compare the performance of different specifi-
cations of the gravity model when the seasonal variation of
F&V is taken into account (i.e. using monthly trade flows
of specific sectors). 
In favor of the methodology proposed in the present re-
search, it can be argued that although those records that
equal zero are not taken into account when taking loga-
rithms in the estimated regressions, when we take first dif-
ferences (our preferred specification) to control for the
endogeneity of our variables of interest we might have ei-
ther positive or negative values. If in a particular month, say
in 2007, Morocco does export the sector k to country j, but
in the same month of the previous year (2006) it exported
less; it results in a positive value of the dependent variable
when using the FD methodology. We can also have negati-
ve values of the dependent variable in FD if, for instance, in
a particular month in 2007 sector k was exported to j, and
in the same month of 2006 exports were higher, and hence
the dependent variable takes a negative value. PPML is
used with count variables and is suitable when the depen-
dent variable takes non-negative integer values. It is espe-
cially suitable when excluding zeroes leads to a very low
number of observations reducing the efficiency of the esti-
mator, but as we have monthly and sectoral data, this is not
the case.
Turning now to the specification of regional preferences,
as we aim to capture the relevance of trade preferences for
Morocco, we construct three variables that consider differ-
ent perspectives of trade preferences stemming from the ap-
plication of the agreements13. The first variable (var1) indi-
cates the EP reduction granted to Morocco in the four prod-
ucts, calculated as the agreed reduction of the MFN EP.
When no preferential EP or no EP are applied, this variable
equals 0. In regressions that include this first variable (var1)
we use a relative measure instead of the absolute difference
between the MFN EP and the reduced EP, i.e. the granted
percentage reduction in the MFN EP [1-(EP Pref/ EP
MFN)]. However, the absolute difference is the variable
taken into account to compute a synthetic indicator of the
preferences reflected by means of var1 and var2.
The preferences are limited in two ways: on the one hand,
a preferential EP often applies only to a certain quantity;
over this quantity, a tariff reduction is usually applied. On
the other hand, in periods with no EP in force or no prefer-
ential EP agreed, there is an ad valorem tariff reduction that
may also be limited to a certain quota or reference quantity.
Therefore, we define a second variable (var2), which corre-
sponds to the ad valorem tariff reduction and captures the
effects of the quantitative constraints. The variable is calcu-
lated as the percentage of reduction in regard to the MFN
ad valorem tariff. 
Finally, we develop a third indicator (var3) to be includ-
ed in a unique model specification that encompasses the im-
pact of the two abovementioned trade policy instruments,
i.e. it focuses on both the preferential EP and the tariff re-
duction. Specifically, var3 is constructed as the sum of the
standardized14 value of var1 and the standardized value of
var2. The effect of the three variables on Moroccan F&V
exports is expected to be positive, as the higher the prefer-
ences granted to Morocco, the higher the Moroccan exports
are expected to be. Table 2 summarizes the values of the
three variables and the cases when they occur.
5.2. Main results
With regards to the obtained results, we first observe that
the variable that measures the reduction in the EP, has pos-
itively affected monthly exports from Morocco (var1, see
columns 1-2 in Table 3)15. Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 show
the results related to var2, which takes into account the tar-
iff reduction linked to quotas. The results show that the es-
timated coefficient for var2 is positive and significant at
10% significance level in equation (4) (column 2), although
it is positive and significant at 1% level when using FD.
The var3 is positive and significant in both FE and FD spec-
ifications (see columns 3 and 5 in Table 2). The most con-
servative results obtained for the synthetic indicator, i.e.
var3, show that ceteris paribus a one-unit increase in the in-
dex of preferences granted to Morocco is estimated to in-
8
13 Note that because the tariffs applied in preferential agreements
are generally defined as percentages of MFN tariffs, a multilateral
trade liberalization agreement would imply the same reduction for
preferential tariffs as for MFN tariffs. It allows (partially) guarding
against preferences erosion (Tangermann, 2002; Emlinger et al.,
2010).
14 Mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1.
15 This variable does not vary enough to estimate β by FD. When
we run FE regressions, var1 is introduced alone in the regressions
(column 1) and with var2 (column 2).
Table 2 - Cases in the preference variables.
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crease monthly exports of F&V by about 12% (column 5).
Finally, as each variable is measured in different units, we
calculate beta coefficients to be able to compare the magni-
tude of the effects in terms of standard deviations in the
model presented in column (2): for var1, the beta coeffi-
cient equals 0.26, while it is equal to 0.05 for var2. Accord-
ing to these results, an increase in var1 increases Moroccan
exports to a higher extent than a similar increase in var2.
These results indicate that preferences matter and that the
two types of trade preferences granted to Morocco by the
EU have a positive and significant effect on Moroccan
monthly exports of F&V when considering the four goods
altogether. Furthermore, the type of preferences applied is
also relevant and, in particular, we have found that the pref-
erential EP granted to Morocco is a more effective strategy
to increase Moroccan exports than the reduction in the
MFN ad valorem tariff. 
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
After the main results, an additional analysis is carried
out aiming at showing whether the previous results are dif-
ferent considering fruits vs. vegetables and also by destina-
tion country. As mentioned above, there are noticeable dif-
ferences among the importing EU countries selected re-
garding the historical trade flows with Morocco, the size of
the domestic market, the productive pattern and the likely
competition with Moroccan products. Regarding the differ-
ences between fruits and vegetables, only the quotas for
tomatoes are binding, which could imply differences in the
significance of variables by increasing the significance of
var2 for vegetables. Therefore, we check if country and sec-
toral heterogeneity, i.e. heterogeneity among importers and
of fruits vs. vegetables, imply differences in the effect of the
trade preferences and so, we run separate regressions to
seek for different behaviors between F&V, and between im-
porting EU countries.
In a first sensitivity test, we run regressions separately for
fruits and vegetables. Specifically, we re-estimate equation
(4) including var1 in a regression for fruits (oranges and
mandarins) and both var1 and var2 in a regression for veg-
etables (tomatoes and cucumbers), as tomatoes are the only
F&V where we observe that the quotas were filled in the
period taken into account. The first two columns of Table 4
show the results obtained. They highlight the differences in
the influence on exports of the two variables, as in vegeta-
bles the reduced EP is not significant to increase exports.  
As a second sensitivity test, we re-run equation (4) by in-
troducing into the model the interaction of var1, which we
have found to be overall the more effective strategy to in-
crease Moroccan exports to the EU, and a dummy variable
for every importer (France is the base group). Then, we
modify equation (4) as follows:
For the case of the UK, for example, the semi-elasticity of
exports with respect to the preferential EP granted to Mo-
rocco is 100 · (β1 + β2). Note that as ‘UK’ is a dichotomous
variable that equals 1 when the importer is the UK (0 oth-
erwise), if β1 >0 and β2 >0 the positive effect of var1 is
higher for Moroccan exports to the United Kingdom than to
France. Otherwise, if β1 >0 and β2 <0, then the positive ef-
fect of var1 is higher for Moroccan exports to France than
to the United Kingdom.
Column 3 in Table 4 shows the obtained results for the four
products taken into account. We find the highest positive ef-
fect of the EP system for France, Germany and Hungary (note
that βˆ3 and βˆ7, although negative signed, are not statistically
significant), and the lowest effect is found for Belgium and, to
a lesser degree, Spain and the Slovak Republic. In these three
cases, the semi-elasticities are between zero and one, while
for the other destinations they are more than two.
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Table 3 - Main results.
 FE1- Fruits (1) FE2- Vegetables (2) FE1 with interactions- Fruits and vegetables (3) 
var1 9.497*** (9.543) -0.351 (-0.438) 5.968*** (11.329) 
var2 - 1.655*** (5.039) - 
var1*UK - - -3.862*** (-5.686) 
var1*Germany - - -0.955 (-1.065) 
var1*Spain - - -5.097*** (-7.818) 
var1*Italy - - -3.521*** (-2.759) 
var1*Slovakia - - -4.958*** (-5.744) 
var1*Hungary - - -3.431 (-1.157) 
var1*Netherlands - - -1.580** (-2.144) 
var1*Belgium - - -5.314*** (-4.269) 
Observations 661 797 1458 
R2 0.6291815 0.8580066 0.3786418 
RMSE 1.388773 0.9884984 1.245372 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are provided in 
brackets. 
Table 4 - Sensitivity analysis
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6. Conclusion and policy implications
Moroccan authorities have undertaken an aggressive
trade liberalization agenda, including bilateral trade agree-
ments with main players such as the EU or the United S-
tates. In these agreements Morocco has pushed hard to ob-
tain significant trade preferences in some sectors with com-
parative advantages such as F&V, allowing in turn market
access concessions in other sectors such as sugar or cereals.
These preferences may be relevant in economic terms due
to the relative high level of custom duties for agro-food
products, resulting from a trade liberalization process that is
slower than in other goods.
With this panorama, this paper aims to quantify the effect
of the different trade preferences granted to Morocco by the
EU on F&V trade flows. For the empirical application, we
focus on monthly exports of four F&V –cucumbers, toma-
toes, oranges and clementines- from Morocco to a number of
EU countries that account for the majority of Moroccan ex-
ports over the period 2005 to 2012. By using panel tech-
niques (fixed effects and first differences) to deal with endo-
geneity problems that are inherent to trade policy variables,
as  is the case of Preferential and Free Trade Agreements, we
analyze the effect of different measures of trade preferences
granted to Morocco. Specifically, we have designed a set of
variables to account for the wide array of different preferen-
tial concessions in a more detailed way than previous re-
search. The paper shows that these variables can be included
in a gravity approach to quantify and compare the effect that
different types of preferences have on exports. 
Our results indicate that trade preferences granted to Mo-
rocco by the EU have a positive and significant effect on
Moroccan monthly exports of F&V. These results are in line
with previous research based on the gravity framework to
deal with the specificities of Euro-Med F&V trade. The
preferential EP is significant and positive for Moroccan ex-
ports, as is the ad valorem reduction in tariffs over EP quo-
ta or when no preferential EP applies. Besides, such tariff
reduction increases its relevance in vegetables, when the
quota is filled, as is the case of tomatoes. 
Additionally, the preferential EP granted to Morocco
seems to increase Moroccan exports to a higher extent. This
is in line with the results obtained by Emlinger et al. (2010)
-with a different methodology, the preference margin- who
find that preferential EP offers Morocco a considerable ad-
vantage, mainly for tomatoes, cucumbers and mandarins. N-
evertheless, this fact needs to be qualified with the result that,
when running separately the regressions for fruits and for
vegetables, the reduced EP is not relevant to foster exports in
the case of vegetables. This result can be explained by the re-
strictiveness of the EP for vegetables, even after been low-
ered by the preferences; on the other hand, for fruits, the low-
ering of the trigger EP to preferential level allows increasing
exports, hence the preferential level is not restrictive.
These results are also in line with those of Goetz and
Grethe (2009), who measure the “relevance” of the EP sys-
tem with a very detailed empirical analysis. They find that
Standard Import Values (SIVs) for Moroccan tomatoes and
cucumbers tend to accumulate much closer to the preferen-
tial EP than SIVs for Moroccan oranges and clementines. It
indicates that “exporters could supply at lower prices but do
not do so in order to avoid triggering specific tariffs” (Goetz
and Grethe, 2009, p. 85). In the same line, Garcia-Alvarez-
Coque et al. (2010) consider that exporters can shift strategi-
cally upwards their supply curve for the cases with SIVs ac-
cumulated slightly above or below the trigger EP. In their
analysis of the SIVs for tomatoes, cucumbers, clementines
and table grapes in a given marketing year, they find pieces
of evidence of such behavior taking place for Moroccan cu-
cumbers and tomatoes in specific time periods.  
Furthermore, we find that the effect of trade preferences on
F&V to foster exports differs by importing country, since the
effect is greater for France, Germany and Hungary than for
the other countries. In the case of France, it could indicate
that historical and consolidated trade relations matter when
exploiting the preferences. On the other extreme, the export-
fostering effect of preferences for Spain and Belgium as im-
porters is of minor relevance. The result could be related to
the presence of a strong domestic production competing with
Moroccan production. Nevertheless, the competition issue
remains open as a thorough analysis considering origins,
qualities and prices could be more determinant.
These results contribute to the debate on the political ap-
proach chosen by the Moroccan Government to foster food
security. Indeed, they indicate that the Moroccan policy op-
tion consisting on negotiating trade preferences in sectors
with comparative advantages has been translated into ex-
port increases. According to Cardamone (2011, p. 565) “in
the literature on the effect of PTAs [preferential trade a-
greements] on trade, trade preferences are more often rep-
resented by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the importer
grants a preference to the exporter and 0 otherwise, which
is used to estimate the trade creation effect of a PTA”. Fol-
lowing this interpretation, and using more accurate vari-
ables to measure trade preferences, our analysis provides
evidence of the existence of trade creation effects of the EU
trade preferences granted to Morocco. Nonetheless, it does
not take into account trade diversion effects. Further re-
search could investigate whether the EU trade preferences
granted have a trade diverting effect for those extra-EU
partners that might be considered competitors for Morocco.
With regards to the increase of exports, previous research
has proven that the value-added agriculture in SEMCs is
lower than in other developing countries (Binswanger-
Mkhize and McCalla, 2010) and hence more emphasis has
to be given to non-price competitiveness strategies to add
value. Instead, agricultural policies that only aim at lower-
ing production costs irrespective of their impact on con-
sumer value may harm the competitiveness of the value
chain (Sausman et al., 2015); accordingly, these authors
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propose a set of alternative actions to improve quality at-
tributes as perceived by consumers in destination countries,
both in production and in post-harvest operations. There-
fore, to fully accrue the advantages in access to the EU mar-
ket, Morocco could foster the dissemination of market in-
formation, incentivize the adoption of the adequate vari-
eties, and can provide with quality control and certification
facilities, among other actions in this line.
In this respect, literature identifies barriers to participate
in international markets particularly burdening smallhold-
ers, such as the poor access to market information, lack of
literacy and technical skills, poor organization and infra-
structures, and onerous pre-requisites to engage into the pri-
vate standards (see Fayet and Vermuelen, 2012; Vorley and
Thorpe, 2014). Some of these barriers could be eased with
extension and local research (King-Okumu and
Aboukheira, 2015) carried out by national authorities, per-
haps with the support of the EU funding through the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural
Development (ENPARD), as discussed below. The role of
public-private investment in infrastructure has been recent-
ly demonstrated as an enhancer of agricultural exports in a
set of developing countries, being Morocco among them
(Soriano and Garrido, 2015).
Notwithstanding with that, the food price spikes occurred
since 2007 have put into question the export-orientated ap-
proach in some SEMCs (Harrigan, 2012), including ele-
ments in the discussion about achieving food security other
than fostering exports. As an instance, Lampietti et al.
(2012) highlighted the high logistics costs for cereal im-
ports in a number of countries in the region. In fact, most of
the final cost of the cereals imported is due to transport and
storage costs. These authors calculated that port logistics
were a bottleneck for Moroccan imports, in terms of both
costs and time. Hence, improving logistics services could
lower the import bill and contribute to achieve food securi-
ty at country level.
Another key element influencing food security in Moroc-
co –and, in general, in all the SEMCs- is sustainability. In
fact, Morocco adopted its Green Morocco Plan in 2008, as
its new a strategy to foster development and tackle food in-
security. Apart from bolstering the agro-exporter sectors,
the sustainable use of resources appears as a crucial element
in the actions planned. In terms of deterioration of natural
resources, soil erosion and the deterioration of the arable
layer is a growing concern in Morocco, especially in remote
and dry regions, where the local population is overusing
this resource due to the population growth and does not
have enough financial capacity and skills to manage it in a
more prudent way. Similarly, the SEMCs region is well
known for its limitations in water availability, due to its ir-
regularity, scarcity and fragility (Blinda and Thivet, 2009).
According to these authors, Morocco is currently under a
water stress in terms of availability per inhabitant, although
it is in a better position than other SEMCs under water
shortage. Besides, their prospects indicate an increment in
the exploitation index of this resource, with situation wors-
ening for 2025. While the specific actions to be taken to en-
hance sustainability are beyond the scope of this paper, it
can be argued that any long-term strategy for food security
necessarily has to consider how to reduce pressures on nat-
ural resources.
Besides, some authors argue that the past emphasis put on
trade liberalization has distracted attention from other is-
sues crucial to agricultural and rural development in SEM-
Cs (Petit, 2015; Petit el al., 2015). Particularly, they point
out the need of bolstering civil society organizations and lo-
cal institutions such as genuine farmer cooperatives, local
microcredit institutions or water use associations. In this re-
spect, the ENPARD initiative can be an opportunity to sup-
port local institutions through its funds and the European
experience on enhancing local networks. 
As a final policy implication, we turn now the attention to
the EU side. In the past, EU producers of F&V have been
reluctant to the market access concessions given to Moroc-
co, being the debate on the last revision of the Euro-
Mediterranean agreement the last acrimonious instance. In
fact, overall volumes imported by the EU have not in-
creased sharply as a result of subsequent agreements and re-
visions, with the biggest market share for intra-EU origins
in F&V such as the four products studied in this paper.
However, it is undeniable that for certain products, some
specific days or weeks, EU prices have been affected by im-
port surges from Morocco. Nevertheless, the issue of lack
of profitability experienced by some EU F&V producers
has more to do with the uneven distribution of market pow-
er along the value chain than with the Moroccan and SEMC
competition (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque et al., 2012).
The EU is beginning to acknowledge the problem of the
uneven distribution of market power and in the last 2014
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform some steps are
taken in this direction in the agricultural sector, while some
Member States are exploring regulations in this same di-
rection. Besides, the CAP is encouraging the collective ac-
tion of producers of F&V through the Producers’ Organiza-
tions (POs) as an instrument to overcome this unbalance s-
ince decades ago. According to the past performance of
POs, the effects of this policy on concentrating the supply
vary across EU countries and the level of concentration is
smaller in Southern EU countries. But certainly this policy
is encouraging market orientation with farmers planning
their production and meeting demand requirements increas-
ingly as time goes by. In our opinion, this policy is more ad-
equate to face the EU producers’ challenges, such as foreign
competition, than non-targeted income transfers or an un-
likely return to stricter border protection.
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